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Abstract: Our work is a contribution to automation design for human-machine cooperation
with explicit emancipated cooperative decision making. We propose an adaptive negotiation
framework as a model for human-machine interaction on decision level. This expands modeling
of human-machine cooperation, starting at the stabilization and trajectory level with approaches
such as shared control, towards higher levels of interaction as guidance and navigation. In
essence, the framework extends the well-known basic negotiation model of multi-agent systems
by an explicit adaptation of the agent’s negotiation behavior. The adaptation is based on an
opponent model using a Bayesian learning approach. An exemplary implementation for the
application of human-automation interaction in autonomous driving is introduced. First results
prove the high flexibility of the framework to model human negotiation behavior.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Human-machine cooperation has been studied extensively
over the past decades, resulting in a wide range of models,
automation design approaches and applications (Flemisch
et al., 2016; Della Penna et al., 2010; Mortl et al., 2012;
Flad et al., 2014). One major class of approaches is haptic
shared control. These approaches often aim at identifying
the goal of the human and support his actions towards
this goal while working towards secondary objectives,
cf. Della Penna et al. (2010) and Mortl et al. (2012). Other
approaches consider the automation as an emancipated
partner, e. g. whenever a differential game is applied to
model the human-machine cooperation, cf. Flad et al.
(2014), and assume a common goal or reference trajectory.
Furthermore, all of these models consider interactions that
incorporate a haptic component and take place via some
object, e. g. a table (Mortl et al., 2012), or some system
interface, e. g. the steering wheel of a car (Flad et al., 2014)
or an active joystick (Oguz et al., 2012).
In summary, these approaches tackle assistance design
and cooperation modeling on the stabilization layer of
human behavior, see Fig. 1. However, a higher degree of
automation leads to a different kind of human-machine
interaction on decision level (Flemisch et al., 2016). This
pushes the development of automation designs for cooper-
ation into the guidance and navigation layer. One aspect
of cooperation on higher levels is cooperative decision
making. Usually, the master-slave principle with the hu-
man ultimately in the lead is applied, cf. Mortl et al.
(2012). However, with an increasing reliability of sensors
and automated systems in general, it is beneficial to design
the automation intrinsically as an equal partner to the
human in order to achieve an emancipated cooperative
decision making process. As an example for the need of
emancipated automation design, consider RADAR sensors
and the networking of cars that yield higher insights in
long-range traffic situations that are incomprehensible for
humans. Another example are infrared sensors that may
provide vital environmental data for firemen operating in
exoskeletons. In both cases, the information obtained by
the automation adds real value to human decision making.
Consequently, the aim of this work is to provide an intu-
itive interface for human interaction with such elaborate
systems on decision level. In contrast to simply presenting
all available information to the human, an intuitive inter-
face avoids a potential mental overload within the human
(Landau, 2002). Hence, the automation must present con-
densed and interpreted information to the human while





Fig. 1. Three human behavioral layers introduced by
Donges (1999)
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all available information to the human, an intuitive inter-
face avoids a potential mental overload within the human
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In summary, these approaches tackle assistance design
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automation leads to a different kind of human-machine
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pushes the development of automation designs for cooper-
ation into the guidance and navigation layer. One aspect
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(2012). However, with an increasing reliability of sensors
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Furthermore, our systems design is inspired by human-
human cooperative decision making. This is motivated by
our preliminary work that found high agreement rates
among humans in cooperative decision making (Rothfuss
et al., 2018) and studies on stabilization level that indicate
potentially high acceptance rates in case of equal modeling
of human and automation (Groten et al., 2013).
In summary, the proposed approach includes an inherent
emancipated modeling of the cooperative decision making
situation between human and automation that is close to
a human-human decision making setting. Similar to the
stabilization layer, the approach on decision level has to
consider challenges that come with human-machine inter-
action which are explained in the following.
1.1 Challenges of Human-Machine Interaction
The automation design for an emancipated human-
machine cooperation offers a variety of challenges:
• the choice of the appropriate theory for modeling
emancipated partners
• the model has to adequately describe human inter-
action capabilities, i. e. interaction based on discrete
events at random times, cf. Mell and Gratch (2017)
• the design of identification methods due to the ex-
pected small number of exchanges with few com-
munication symbols until an agreement is reached,
resulting in potentially insufficient information gain
for behavior identification, i. e. model fitting
• modeling of human reflection and adaptation tech-
niques to change decision making behavior, cf. Vahi-
dov et al. (2014)
In our approach we tackle all of these challenges and adapt
state-of-the-art approaches to better suit human behavior
in cooperative decision making.
1.2 State-of-the-art Approaches
The two major theories that provide models for coopera-
tive decision making are negotiation theory (e. g. Baarslag
et al. (2015)) and game theory (e. g. (Altendorf and
Flemisch, 2014)). In this paper we focus on negotiation
theory due to its explicit form of interaction modeling.
There are several active negotiation models available for
multi-agent systems with autonomous agents. Examples
are collision avoidance for airplanes (Sislak et al., 2011)
and vessels (Yang et al., 2007). Similarly, some models are
available for human-machine negotiation, e. g. the postmen
problem (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1989) and the buyer-
seller scenario (Vahidov et al., 2014).
However, these models are unsuitable for the targeted
form of human-machine interaction and resulting chal-
lenges given in Section 1.1. Reasons are mainly the mod-
els’ assumption of a high rate of communication and the
lack of an explicit adaptation mechanism. Therefore we
introduced in previous work a new negotiation model in
the context of driving assistance (Rothfuss et al., 2019).
It contains both an asynchronous communication protocol
to suit the discrete event character of human action and
communication as well as an opponent model to draw
advantage from deeper insights into the opponent’s reason-
ing. However, the identification model is underperforming
in case of limited communication.
1.3 Contribution
In this paper we propose a generalized framework for
cooperative decision making in human-machine interaction
that incorporates the event-based negotiation model of
Rothfuss et al. (2019) and an identification approach for
identifying opponent’s behavior. The new framework also
allows a generalized, explicit strategy for adaptation of
negotiation tactics. In addition, the paper provides an
application of the introduced framework to the context
of autonomous driving and simulation results that show
the ability of the framework to cope with the challenges of
cooperative decision making involving humans.
The autonomous driving scenario is an exemplary sce-
nario for demonstrating the adaptive negotiation frame-
work. More complex driving situations and other human-
machine negotiation scenarios, e. g. in robotics, are also in
the scope of the proposed framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 introduces the adaptive negotiation framework
and its exemplary application to autonomous driving. This
is followed by some simulation results of an exemplary
negotiation setting in Section 3 and the conclusion in
Section 4.
2. ADAPTIVE NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
The following section introduces the adaptive negotiation
framework based on the negotiation model introduced by
Rothfuss et al. (2019). That model is now enhanced by an
suitable opponent model based on Bayesian Learning and
the generalized adaptation concept. For a more conclusive
view on the framework, the general description is presented
alongside an exemplary application to a scenario in the
context of autonomous driving.
2.1 Framework Overview
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the introduced framework and
the interaction between its components. The objective of
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negotiation over a set of decision options D by exchanging
offers oν among participating agents i ∈ {A,B} (automa-
tion & human) at time ν. Within the basic negotiation
model, agents interact according to the negotiation pro-
tocol, evaluate offers by means of an individual utility
function and accept or generate offers via acceptance and
bidding strategies. Through an opponent model and the
explicit adaptation component, agents are able to adapt
their negotiation behavior w. r. t. the previously observed
behavior of their opponent. In order to give a detailed
explanation of the framework’s components alongside the
implementation, we first introduce the exemplary applica-
tion scenario.
2.2 Exemplary Driving Scenario
The exemplary application scenario is set in the context of
autonomous driving. Hence, we assume a fully autonomous
vehicle. However, the human driver is able to interact
with the vehicle via a maneuver interface, e. g. a touch
pad, that allows intuitive changes of the vehicle’s path by
cooperative deciding on an appropriate driving maneuver.
The aim of this form of interaction is to add value to the
overall outcome of the driving task in terms of human
comfort and acceptance. In this setting, both agents, driver
and vehicle, are emancipated, i. e. there is no hierarchy,
w. r. t. cooperative decision making which is modeled by
the adaptive negotiation framework.
The exemplary road scenario is a Manhattan grid nav-
igation setting depicted in Fig. 3. The aim is to reach
the intersection marked with a green dot. At the time
of the negotiation the vehicle is traveling along the black
solid arrow. At the intersection three decision options d
are available for both agents: turn left (d1), drive straight
ahead (d2) and turn right (d3). In addition, each decision
option can be offered with one of three intensity levels
si ∈ S. These levels increase the number of available com-
munication symbols to provide more information about
agents’ reasoning.
The gray boxes indicate traffic delays. The options d can
be rated w. r. t. to the time loss due to a local traffic delay
tl at the current intersection and to the estimated time
to reach the target intersection tg taking into account all
relevant traffic delays on the way.
Note, more complex driving situations could be considered
by including additional external influences like in a parking
lot search situation or a ride-sharing context. Furthermore,
Fig. 3. Evaluation scenario with shortest path to goal in
blue, path avoiding local delays in orange and longest
path with short local delay in gray.
one could think of various other interface designs, allowing
for more and complex communication symbols.
The following sections introduce the adaptive negotiation
framework alongside its application to this exemplary sce-
nario.
2.3 Basic Negotiation Model
An overview of the reasoning of one agent i in the basic
negotiation model is given in Fig. 4. In each cycle of
decision making the agent evaluates its own current offer
oi and the opponent’s offer o¬i with its utility function Ui.
Then he decides whether the opponent’s offer should be
accepted or rejected according to its acceptance strategy
A. If the opponent’s offer is declined, the agent determines
a new counter offer in line with his bidding strategy. This
offer is presented to the opponent. The next cycle starts
according to the chosen interaction protocol.
In a more formal description the basic negotiation model
consists of the following parts (Baarslag et al., 2015):
(1) An utility function U for evaluating offers o
U : o → R
(2) An acceptance strategy A determining whether to
accept or decline an opponent’s offer o¬i based on
the offer’s utility compared to the utility of an own
offer oi
A (U (oi) , U (o¬i)) → accept/decline
(3) A bidding strategy for determining a counter offer oi
w. r. t. to a concession strategy C. There are three
classes of concession strategies:
(a) Behavior-based strategies reflecting opponent’s
behavior, e. g. tit-for-tat
C (U, o¬i) → oi
(b) Time-based strategies modeling an increasing
concession behavior over time
C (U, ν) → oi
(c) Meta strategies combining behavior- and time-
based strategies















Fig. 4. Overview of reasoning of agent i
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offer oi
A (U (oi) , U (o¬i)) → accept/decline
(3) A bidding strategy for determining a counter offer oi
w. r. t. to a concession strategy C. There are three
classes of concession strategies:
(a) Behavior-based strategies reflecting opponent’s
behavior, e. g. tit-for-tat
C (U, o¬i) → oi
(b) Time-based strategies modeling an increasing
concession behavior over time
C (U, ν) → oi
(c) Meta strategies combining behavior- and time-
based strategies















Fig. 4. Overview of reasoning of agent i
(4) A negotiation protocol for the agents. There are three
major classes:
(a) In the simultaneous protocol, agents exchange
their offers simultaneously.
(b) The alternating protocol describes agents placing
offers in an alternating sequence.
(c) The asynchronous protocol, introduced by Roth-
fuss et al. (2019), enables agents to place offers
at random points in time.
Participating agents of one negotiation agree on the same
negotiation protocol and are characterized by their struc-
ture and parameters of the introduced functions U , A and
C. Usually, it is assumed that all agents possess the same
function structure and only differ in their parameters θ.
Applying this basic negotiation model to the introduced
scenario in Section 2.2 the offer space is defined as
O = D × S = {d1, d2, d3} × {s1, s2, s3} (1)
Utility Function In line with state of the art approaches
we propose a linear combination of evaluation functions
to set up an exemplary utility function for evaluating the
decision option d of offer o = (d, s):
Ui(d) = wg,i · eg(d) + wl,i · el(d) (2)




, el(d) = 1−
tl(d)∑
∀di∈D tl(di)
that also perform a normalization of U . eg(d) penalizes
the time for reaching the target intersection, referred to
as the time-to-goal tg, of a decision option d w. r. t. the
fastest alternative. el(d) penalizes the local traffic delay tl
of decision option d by comparing it to the sum of all local
traffic delays.
The agents were parameterized as follows: Agent A, resem-
bling the automation, focuses on the time to goal whereas
Agent B, the human, tries to avoid local traffic delays.
Acceptance Strategy The acceptance strategy Ai of both
agents i ∈ {A,B} is set to:
A (U (oi) , U (o¬i)) =
{
accept Ui (o¬i) ≥ Ui (oi)
decline Ui (o¬i) < Ui (oi)
(3)
Offers o¬i are accepted if they yield a higher or equal utility
as the own offer oi, otherwise they are declined.
Bidding Strategy In order to ensure the termination of
the negotiation process, we propose a time-based conces-
sion strategy. The concession is modeled via a target utility
Ut(t) that is decreasing over time:
Ut,i(ν) = max
d∈D
Ui(d) · (1− ν1/εi) (4)
ε is called the concession rate.
The agent tries to track his target utility with his offers
utility values. This tracking is defined in the following
two step optimization problem for determining offers oi
of agent i at time instance ν.




with D̃i = {d ∈ D : Ui(d) ≥ Ut,i(ν)}. On this basis and




{Ui(d∗)− ci(s)− Ut,i(ν)} . (6)
ci(s) models the influence of the intensity value, which
gives a measure for the deviation between the utility of














if wc,i = −1
(7)
ws ∈ R is a design parameter of the scenario. If wc,i = 1
the agent will start with maximum intensity and decrease
it in the course of the negotiation, whereas for wc,i = −1
the agent will start with small intensities and gradually
increase the intensity. Either way, the intensity is a com-
munication parameter that indicates how much an agent
clings to the chosen direction, i. e. the effort the agent has
to put in to stay with the chosen direction.
The resulting optimal offer at time instance ν is given by:
oνi = (d
∗, s∗).
Interaction Protocol Due to the use case of human-
machine interaction, we propose to use the asynchronous
protocol of Rothfuss et al. (2019) in order to allow for
a more appropriate modeling of human event-based com-
munication. The automation is still able to operate at
a constant update rate whereas the human is able to
communicate at any time.
2.4 Opponent Modeling
In order to influence the outcome of the negotiation,
agents may use the information from their opponent’s
offers to identify an opponent model and apply this infor-
mation within their bidding strategy. In literature, various
opponent models are available (Zeng and Sycara, 1998;
Coehoorn and Jennings, 2004; Hindriks and Tykhonov,
2008; Hao and Leung, 2014). Facing the challenge of little
communication among automation and human within one
round of negotiation, we propose to apply an opponent
model that is able to identify human behavior over several
rounds. One possible method of opponent modeling is
the Bayesian learning approach (Hindriks and Tykhonov,
2008).
Bayesian learning requires some assumptions about the
opponent’s strategy. In our approach we assume that the
agents follow the same basic negotiation model and only
differ in their parameters of utility, concession and accep-
tance functions. Upon this assumption and observed op-
ponent’s offers, Bayesian learning identifies the unknown
parameters θ of the opponent’s utility function and bidding
strategy. In a first step, nh combinations of parameters
θ are set up as hypotheses hj , j ∈ [1, nh] ⊂ N. Then,
based on the usually small number of observed opponent’s
offers o¬i, the likelihood of parameter hypotheses P (hj)
is updated by means of Bayes’ rule




For all j the probabilities P (hj) are initialized with a
uniform distribution. To avoid the persistent exclusion of
hypotheses with P (hj) = 0 in a changing behavior setting,
hypothesis probabilities are reinitialized at the beginning
of each new round of identification by adding a small offset
c followed by normalization. The offset c is set w. r. t. the
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application, in our case c = 0.001.
The current estimate of the opponent’s parameters in step
ν can be determined as the expected value of θ w. r. t. to
all hj .
In a practical application the hypotheses for Bayesian
learning can be set up via a discretization of the assumed
range of opponent’s parameters of utility function and
bidding strategy wg, wc, ε. This leads to a set of hypotheses
H = Wg ×Wc × E
= {w1g , ..., w
nwg
g } × {w
1
c , ..., w
nwc
c } × {ε1 , ..., εnε }
each resembling a specific and unique combination of
parameters hj = (wgj , wcj , εj) ∈ H.
Next, a probability P (hj) is assigned to each hypothesis.
For the update of this probability based on the observed
offer oν¬i at time instance ν, (8) is reformulated to










In order to calculate the update, P (oν¬i | hj) has to be
determined. This likelihood depends on a-priori knowledge
on opponent’s behavior and observed offers and can be
reformulated to:







P (sν¬i | dν¬i, hj) · P (dν¬i | hj) · P (hj)
P (hj)
= P (sν¬i | dν¬i, hj) · P (dν¬i | hj)
(10)
To determine these likelihoods we follow the assumption
that both agents follow the same bidding and acceptance
strategy. P (dν¬i | hj) depends on the bidding and accep-
tance strategy, i. e. (5) and (3). Therefore, the offer of the










The index (·)h indicates the parameterization of the cor-
responding function with the parameters of hypothesis h.
Besides ensuring that the opponent’s utility of the chosen
direction lies above target utility, condition (11) also takes
into account that this utility must be higher than that of
the last own offer w. r. t. the opponent’s utility measure.
Otherwise this offer would have been accepted by the
opponent.
All hypotheses fulfilling this condition explain the current
chosen direction of the opponent. Therefore a uniform
distribution is assigned to these hypotheses:
P (dν¬i | hj) =
{
1
|D∗| if (11) holds
0 else
(12)
with D∗ = {d ∈ D | (11) holds}
P (sν¬i | dν¬i, hj) depends on the intensity determination
(6). Therefore the following condition has to hold:
sν¬i = argmin
s∈S
{Uh(dν¬i)− ch(s)− Ut,h(ν)} (13)
All hypotheses that fulfill this condition explain the cur-
rent chosen intensity at the current direction. Due to the
fact that only one intensity per direction is valid, the
probability is set to
P (sν¬i | dν¬i, hj) =
{
1 if (13) holds
0 else
(14)
Based on the computed hypothesis probability distribution
P (h | oν¬i), the estimated expected parameters θ̂¬i of the
opponent and their variance σ can be calculated.
2.5 Adaptation
In the following we introduce the explicit adaptation com-
ponent of our negotiation framework that alters the pa-
rameters of the basic negotiation model of an agent from
Section 2.3 based on the insights given by the identified
negotiation behavior of the opponent (cf. Section 2.4).
Usually, the opponent model information is directly in-
cluded in the bidding strategy, cf. Hao and Leung (2014),
e. g. to choose an offer that suits the opponent best in
case one is indifferent towards multiple potential offers
(Fukuta et al., 2016, p. 137). Other approaches use utility
predictions to adapt the target utility and thus concession
behavior with the aim to maximize utility (Chen et al.,
2013). However, in our framework, we include a more
powerful adaptation principle that is based on an explicit
evaluation of the agent’s current negotiation behavior (de-
scribed by parameters θ) w. r. t. e. g. potential outcome
U (θ) and required effort E (θ) to achieve this outcome:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
J (U (θ) , E (θ)) (15)
This structure allows to model an overall negotiation be-
havior that factors in the opponent’s behavior e. g. giving
in immediately if the opponent model indicates a strong
resistance towards the own preference or insisting on one’s
preference if the corresponding costs are worth the effort.
In essence the adaptation component optimizes the param-
eters of the bidding strategy w. r. t. an objective function
J . The adaptation process does not have to be simulta-
neous to the offer exchange. Instead, it could take place
at the end of a negotiation round. That way one can
think of the behavior within a negotiation round as the
tactics of negotiation and the adaptation as the strategy
of negotiation, see Fig. 5. Furthermore, this approach offers
increased modeling flexibility due to the fact that the
adaptation strategy can be exchanged without changing
the basic negotiation model.
For the adaptation strategy in the described scenario we
propose to evaluate the effort of persuading the opponent
in relation to the expected utility gain. Furthermore, we
propose to adapt only the concession rate of an agent, not
the weights of the utility function. Hence, the negotiation
behavior is changed, not the values of the agent. This is





Fig. 5. Tactical and strategical layer of the adaptive
negotiation framework
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w. r. t. ε ∈ θi.
δ ∈ ]0, 1] is an adaptation design parameter and νT (·)
represents the time at which the negotiation is expected
to end assuming a specific parameterization of the agents.
UTi (·) is the utility at time νT (·) for agent i.
To actually update the concession rate we consider the
variance of the identification result and a risk disposition
ri of agent i:
εν+1i = ε
ν
i + α(σ, ri) · (ε∗i − ενi ) (17)
The risk disposition factor ri ∈ ]0, 1] is a design parameter
that influences the adaptation behavior of the agent. The
higher the factor the more prepared the agent is to take
risks. The proposed function α : σ, ri → [0, 1] ⊂ R
evaluates the variance of the current parameter estimation













nσ is the number of estimated parameters (and corre-
sponding variances).
In summary, the higher the risk disposition of an agent,
the faster his behavior, i. e. concession parameter, will
converge to the optimal one regarding the adaptation




The simulation results for the proposed framework are
based on the times in Table 1 and the scenario of Sec-
tion 2.2 with |S| = 3 intention levels and corresponding
weight of ws = 1. The negotiation time tN is normalized,
i. e. tN = 0 represents the time the first agent places a bid.
At tN = 1 the negotiation deadline is reached at which the
vehicle has to start one of the potential maneuvers.
The agents are parameterized as follows (cf. Section 2.3):
εA/B = 1, wc = 1, wg,A = 1, wg,B = 0.
Both agents are able to identify the negotiation behavior
of the opponent. In addition, agent A is able to adapt
its negotiation behavior with δ = 0.8 and rA = 0.3, (cf.
Section 2.5). Furthermore, agent A is set to propose offers
at a constant update rate whereas agent B, representing
the human, interacts at random times.
3.2 Description
Fig. 6 shows a negotiation process without adaptation. The
agreement on option d2 is indicated by a yellow circle.
The vertical bars represent different levels of intensities.
Note that due to the asynchronous protocol the agents
Table 1. Times for local traffic delay and time
to goal intersection
D tg tl
d1 (left) 390 10
d2 (straight) 140 0
d3 (right) 80 40





UA(oA) cA(sA) UB(oB) cB(sB)
Fig. 6. Negotiation process without adaptation.
tN







wg,B ŵg,B εB ε̂B
Fig. 7. Identification process of agent A without adapta-
tion. Actual parameters are depicted with solid lines,
dotted lines are the estimates.
are allowed to interact at random times. Therefore, agent
B detects the agreement only at his next interaction
time. The corresponding performance of the identification
method of agent A is depicted in Fig. 7. The estimated
values (dashed lines) converge from their starting values
at tN = 0 towards the real values (solid line). Note
that changes in direction offered or in intensity values
contribute most to improvements regarding the parameter
estimation, as they provide a high information content.
Furthermore, note that the identification results for wc
are not depicted as this parameter was always identified
correctly.
Fig. 8 shows a negotiation round in which agent A adapts
its behavior. He becomes more intransigent and therefore
is able to convince agent B with his offer for option d3.
Fig. 9 presents the identification performance of agent B of
the changing behavior of agent A. The adaptation process
is visible regarding the changing green trajectories of the
concession parameter εA from high to low values, i. e. from
concessive to intransigent behavior. Also the identification
ability of changing negotiation behavior is visible as the
estimates follow the actual values with a small delay.
3.3 Discussion
The proposed adaptive framework is able to model ne-
gotiation scenarios that lead to an agreement between
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Fig. 8. Negotiation process with adaptation.
tN







wg,A ŵg,A εA ε̂A
Fig. 9. Identification process of agent B showing adapta-
tion of agent A
emancipated agents. The agents are allowed to commu-
nicate at different rates and with intensities as additional
communication symbols. Furthermore, the proposed iden-
tification method is able to identify the behavior of the
opponent (cf. Fig. 7), even if it is changing (cf. Fig. 9). The
explicit adaptation strategy allows the agent to change
his negotiation behavior based on the estimated effort
and outcome of persuading the opponent (cf. Fig. 8). As
a result the outcome of the negotiation may be differ-
ent to the one without adaptation. The ability to adapt
w. r. t. some objective function, in this case the trade-off
between outcome utility and effort to achieve it, is a great
advantage of our framework. In comparison to existing
adaptation techniques that e. g. adapt the target utility
for only maximizing the outcome utility our approach is
more generalized and allows for more efficient negotiations.
Furthermore, we are able to evaluate different objective
functions in order to determine an appropriate adaptation
behavior in the context of human-machine interaction.
4. CONCLUSION
A new framework to model emancipated cooperative deci-
sion making is proposed. The scope of the framework is the
automation design for human-machine cooperation on a
decision level. The framework extends state-of-the-art ne-
gotiation models by an explicit adaptation strategy of ne-
gotiation behavior. This yields a high modeling flexibility
as the adaptation strategy can be changed independently
of the negotiation model. Furthermore, the challenges of
little communication with few symbols in human-machine
negotiation is addressed by an adequate opponent model-
ing and identification method based on Bayesian learning.
The demonstrated variability and identification abilities
of the framework encourage the automation design based
on the proposed model and its implementation in a real
application in order to study user acceptance and validate
the generalized negotiation model. A suitable application
could be a highly automated vehicle in which the human is
able to interfere with the vehicle guidance automation on
a maneuver command basis via e. g. a touch pad. Each ma-
neuver is associated with a certain utility that is individual
for both agents based on their information about the
scenario. Hence, the resulting cooperative decision making
is an intuitive cooperative maneuver selection based on
information fusion of both, human and automation.
REFERENCES
Altendorf, E. and Flemisch, F. (2014). Prediction of
driving behavior in cooperative guidance and control:
A first game-theoretic approach. In Andreas Wende-
muth (ed.), 3. Interdisziplinärer Workshop : Kognitive
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